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1) Similar to the romanticized notion of cultural uniqueness, this class
consciousness can also be considered an ccimagined" component of the Irish
national self (Anderson 1983). Indeed, while many nationalists of the time touted
the need for collective economic control to aid the lower classes, they were
simultaneously wary of alienating themselves from Irish landowners, whose
support they saw as a necessary component to repealing the British Union
(Nowlan 1994). Thus, while socialism contributed an anti-liberal and class
unifying sense of self to Irish nationalist rhetoric, landlord privilege was
implicitly understood as necessary to practical politics of the day.
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Abstract
Early civil rights activism priorto 1954 Brown case ismarked
by theabsence ofan intervening agency ororganization associ-
ated with the typeof mass mobilization found in theMont-
gomery Bus Boycott and other events in thelatercivil rights
movement. The communityactionin Topeka, Kansas before
Brown illustrates that civil rights actions havealways been
around, but only recent scholarship of thecivil rights move-
ment has brought these seemingly less signifu:ant campaigns to
theforeground. The activism in Topeka, Kansas, characterized
asindirect action tactics, was organized around primarilylo-
callevel issues. These local level issues were also historically
situated priorto thenationalpushto desegregation which oc-
curred afterthe1954 Browndecision.
Introduction
The 1954 landmark Brown v. BoardofEducation ofTopeka deci-
sion was a significant national step in the fight against segrega-
tion (Bloom 1987; Blumberg 1984; Branch 1988; Brenner 1994;
Chafe 1980; Dalifume 1968; Greenberg 1994; Klarman 1994;
Kluger 1976; Lawson 1991). It was also followed by and grew
out of a significant local victory against segregation in the city of
Topeka, Kansas. This paper discusses indirect action tactics un-
•Research funding was assistedbya Summer1997Faculty A&S Grant, College
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dertaken by African Americans in the city of Topeka between
1940 and 1954. During this period, multiple efforts were made
to end segregation in public accommodations and schools.
Though the name of the famous school desegregation case bears
the title Brownv. Board ofEducation ofTopeka, the role that the
community of Topeka played in the events that led up to the
court case under emphasized. This lack of interest might be re-
lated to the fact that Topeka, Kansas, was not located in the deep
South, and did not have the same history of violence in race
relations as, for instance, a place like Birmingham, Alabama.
There were no spectacular events such as bombings, race riots,
mass marches, or boycotts that characterized the mass mobiliza-
tions in the South. Little acknowledgment has been given to the
fact that Topeka has its own unique history of race relations and
that its subsequent type of resistance to segregation is related to
those historical relations.
Indirect action tactics undertaken in Topeka prior to 1950 were
affected by the curious mix of segregation and integration in
public accommodations and public schools. The types of tactics
described in this paper do not match up with previous sociologi-
ca~ models of the Southern mass mobilization civil rights cam-
paigns presented by Doug McAdam (1982) and Aldon Morris
(1~84): McAdam's model emphasized the growing national po-
litlcallnsurgency of African Americans after 1938, and Morris'
local movement center model emphasized actions conducted
through African American churches and their clergy. Neither
model provided an entirely adequate method by which to de-
scribe early civil rights activism in Topeka, Kansas prior to 1954.
The indirect action tactics in Topeka were initiated to address
local level grievances and did not have a national orientation until
the Brown case oral arguments were first heard before the Su-
preme Court in December of 1952 (Wilson 1995: 127-155).
168
-r',:"-"~"'-.~j':..
:, ~'''~' ';
-....~..•:_ . BorderStates and Civil RightsActivism Prior to 1955
Indirect Action Tactics in Topeka
I argue that indirect action tactics were utilized to end segregation
in Topeka where confrontational direct action tactics would have
not been effective. Direct action perspectives emphasizing
organizations and formal leadership developed to explain mass-
mobilizations include Morris 1984; McAdam 1982; Killian and
Smith 1960; Oberschal11989; Killian 1984.
Indirect action tactics involve intermediate stages, not directly
aimed at specific goals and involve social changes not immedi-
ately resulting from an action or cause. Indirect action tactics do
not take the shortest course to the desired objective, or go straight
to the point. The indirect action tactics used in Topeka included
numerous actions that on first scrutiny appear to be unrelated.
This is due to fact that the some of indirect action tactics were
peaceful negotiations urging inclusion of African Americans in
all public facilities: movie theaters, swimming pools, and schools.
Historical Legacy of Kansas Race Relations
The indirect action tactics used to help eliminate segregation were
shaped by Kansas' mixture of segregationist and integrationist
cultural patterns. The state's permissive segregation statute pro-
hibited public funded school segregation except for elementary ,
schools in its "first class" cities with a population over 15,000
(Wilson 1995:39). The expansion of Topeka's city limits through
annexation the first part of the twentieth century, resulted in
some African Americans being moved from integrated rural
county schools to segregated city grade schools. This shift in the
boundaries of the city also shifted color line practices in the newly
annexed areas.
The resulting challenges to the color line were brought by those
African Americans who were caught between pressure to pre-
serve segregation within Topeka's city limits and the informal
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tradition of integration to which they were accustomed outside
of the city limits. The period between 1940 following the Gra-
ham case desegregating the junior high schools, and the 1954
Brown decision, can be characterized as a curious mix of accom-
modation and exclusion within the community of Topeka.
The indirect action tactics between 1940 and the 1954 Brown
case can be divided into three phases, the first two of which are
discussed in this essay. First, up to 1947 African Americans chal-
lenged Topeka's segregated public facilities-the municipal swim-
ming pool and movie theaters. Local initiatives were shifted to-
wards challenging elementary school segregation in a second phase
beginning in 1948. These indirect action tactics were undertaken
by breakaway groups from the local NAACP approaching the
Board of Education and culminating in legal petition through
the courts. Finally, in 1950, the third phase began when the
legal case was carried forward by the lawyers of the national
NAACP Legal Defense Fund in 1950. The legal basis and sig-
nificance of the case changed in this phase from addressing local
grievances to national public interests as it was incorporated into
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's desegregation agenda.
Phase One: Challenges to Segregated Public
Accommodations
Indirect action tactics in this first phase were passed between
groups and individuals, without anyone organization or leader
carrying the action forward. Though under the auspices of the
NAACP, the participants who were involved were linked to
individuals who sought to redress singular grievances.
During the 1940s, the mixture of segregation and integration
practices in Topeka was a patchwork:
there was one colored hotel, the Dunbar, and all the rest
were for whites. Almost no restaurants downtown served
colored customers. Before the Second World War, a num-
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ber of...[restaurants] had a sign in the window reading:
'Negroes and Mexicans served in sacks only,' meaning t.hey
could take out food in bags but not eat on the premises.
One movie theater in town admitted colored people to its
balcony. Another, called the Apex, was for colored only.
The other five movie houses were for whites only. The
swimming pool at Gage Park was off-limits to colored, ex-
cept one day a year when they were allowed in for a gala
picnic (Kluger 1976:).
Limited access to public accommodations in Topeka was a~ on-
going issue for African Americans (Co~ 1982:82-110; ~lls~n
1995:229). One such challenge to public accommodations ill
Topeka occurred in 1944. The local NAACP protested the p~o­
posed repeal of a municipal licensure. requireme~t that "prohib-
ited state universities, colleges, public schools, Inns, hotels, or
vehicles of public transportation" from discriminating on the
"basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."1 In the
words of the president of Topeka's local chapter of the NAACP,
R.J. Reynolds, stated that by repealing this law:
Topeka will be showingthe rest of the cities in Ka~sas. how
to find a loophole in the law to deny Negroes of their rights.
Reynolds' public statement alone held open the permissive stat-
ute for three more years, illustrating an ambivalence toward seg-
regation. However, in October 1947, things would change after.
an African American sued a local movie theater after he was de-
nied admission because of his race. Because the theater managers
were found guilty of violating the local municipal ordinance ~ro­
hibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, or preVIOUS
condition of servitude. They were both fined $10.00.2 Though
the matter was quickly resolved in favor of integration, the T 0-
peka City Commission responded by repealing its permissive
licensing requirement for local theaters a few weeks later, on
October 1, 1947.3
Three days later on October 4, 1947, when Ava and Arthur .L~e
Stovall tried to enter the same Dickinson Theater that Phillip
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Burton had sued a month earlier, the Stovalls were not allowed
to buy a ticket.t The NAACP once again responded with a
published statement of protest as it had in 1944. However, this
time the civil rights provision preventing racial discrimination
in public accommodations in Topeka remained repealed thus
effectively removing the legal grounds to sue local businesses.5
Movie theaters, as well as any other public facility in Topeka
operating under a municipal license were no longer prevented
from practicing segregation if they so wished.
Why Topeka revoked its permissive municipal ordinance at this
time cannot be fully explained as simply a reaction to the indi-
rect actions of the NAACP and other individuals involved in
civil rights litigation. First, the NAACP was not the only orga-
nization involved in challenging segregation. Another bi-racial
organization seeking to redress race issues was the local Ameri-
can Veterans Committee (AVe). The Ave was founded in 1946
by returning World War IT veterans as an alternative to the
American Legion, which was segregated (Kluger 1975:391). Its
efforts challenging segregation coincided with those of the local
NAACP. Though the AVC also targeted segregated institutions,
its indirect actions were limited to peaceful public demonstra-
tions.»
The NAACP began another phase of indirect action after they
protested that the repeal of the local civil rights ordinance al-
lowed local businesses to institute racial discrimination.? The
result of this setback caused the NAACP to shift attention from
public accommodations to public schools. This would initiate
another phase of indirect action tactics in 1948.
Phase Two: A Local Challenge to Elementary School
Segregation in Topeka
Planning the challenge to Topeka's segregated schools was done
by the local NAACP. The indirect action tactic it used first was
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to appear before the local school board and request that it com-
pose a plan for integration. The N~CP form~d an ad .hoc
"Citizens Committee" to undertake this task. This comrruttee
was a way to distance themselves from the local NAACP.8
Previous involvement of the NAACP in school desegregation
had been the Graham case, a successful lawsuit against segregated
junior high schools in 1940 which nevertheless ~v~ded its mem-
bership. On one side were the teach~rs and.adnunistrat~rs who
sought to protect their jobs and hostile white community lead-
ers who sought to preserve the racial status quo. On the other
side were those in the community - black and white - who were
sympathetic to desegregation and the injus~i~e ~t sought to re-
dress. It was this faction, oriented toward CIVil rights and deseg-
regation, which had gained control of the localN~CP in 1940
and remained in power throughout the desegregation era.
After the Graham case the School Superintendent [who had been
perceived as sympathetic to integration] was fired. His replace-
ment was School Superintendent Dr. Kenneth McFarland. Wh~n
he was hired as superintendent in 1942, McFarland stated that In
Topeka, "separate schools are here to stay" (.Klug~r 1975:~93).9
McFarland himself would later recall his segregation policy as
merely maintaining the status quo in Topeka's schools.lv
we were operating the schools under essentially the same
structure that we took them over in 1942.... We have no
objective evidence that there is any substantial desire for a
change among the people that the board represents...[T]here
is nothing in the record historically, that it's the place of
the public school system to dictate the social customs of the
people who support the public school system.
McFarland took over administration of Topeka's public schools
right after the Graham case. His policies reflected the re-alig~­
ment of the school board to continue the tightening of public
segregation begun during Topeka's urban expansion and popu-
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lation growth in the 1920s and 1930s. McFarland held "back the
tide" according to Topekan Samuel Jackson (Kluger 1975:404).
Th~ ambivalence toward segregation in Topeka, however, can
be Illustrated by the willingness of the school board to negotiate
and compromise. Jackson continues, "[tjhe school board might
have gone along with desegregation...if McFarland had not re-
sisted." The school board itself was divided on the issue of con-
tinuing segregation. Charles Scott's law partner, Charles Bledsoe
wrote Robert Carter of the NAACP in New York thatl l
...one of our good friends of the white race has polled every
member of the Board of Education; two of them were bit-
terly against integration, and four of them would welcome
a law suit, in order to take the load off their shoulders....
We interpret this as meaning that the Board will not wage
an all-out defense; but this is opinion only.
:Vhe~McFarl:md became adamant that school segregation con-
tinue ill the p.runary grades, the school board suffered a re-align-
ment among Its members toward segregation. As a result of this
re-alignment, McFarland consolidated the power of its commit-
tees into his office; he could then override the elected authority
of the elected school board. 12
McFarland's "iron hand" policy included hiring Harrison
Caldwell as Director of Negro School Education to administer
the ~egregated.schools.13Caldwell played on the existing fears of
African American teachers by reminding them that they would
all lose their jobs if the schools were integrated (Kluger 1975:381-
382).14 Caldwell conducted yearly performance reviews of the
teachers that included weighing their teaching in the classroom
against their attitude toward the administration (Kluger 1975:381).
Mamie Williams, who taught at Buchanan School and later was
Principal at Washington School, recalled that her fellow teach-
ers did not protest this practice for fear of losing their jobs:15
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Since nobody had tenure then and most of the teachers were
unmarried women dependent on their salariesfor their live-
lihood, you went along. (Kluger 1975:381)
Divisions in the African American community toward integra-
tion were also created through school organizations, such as the
Negro Parent Teachers Association (PTA). According to Speer
(1968:27) and Adler (1972:253 fn 103), the African American
teachers in turn put pressure on Topeka's Negro PTA to further
oppose challenges to segregation by influencing the parents of
the children they taught. This resulted in African Americans
acting in support of a white supremacist segregationist policy in
order to preserve community and economic stability. McKinley
Burnett stated
that the Negro PTA ...[had] sent a letter to the Board of
Education expressing their official support of the Board
position. Public ...[segregated]school teachershesitated even
to comment on the case as it was being prepared for court
(emphasis in original) (Speer 1968:27).
The local NAACP tried to overcome the teachers' reluctance
and win their support for school integration. NAACP Presi-
dent, McKinley Burnett stated:16
At one point we called a meeting of the team. First, we had
a man from the National Office (NAACP), a lawyer, who
was going to speak to us....We invited the teachers to come.
They didn't come, not a one.
A second challenge to Topeka's Board of Education ·was an ef-
fort by white elites to remove Superintendent McFarland.
Though this challenge did not overtly emphasize desegregation,
it did challenge the same target: McFarland and members of the
school board who supported him. The white elites' challenge
and the African Americans' challenge were separate but comple-
mentary actions that were clearly not under any common orga-
nizational control. These separate challenges did not share orga-
nizational resources or leadership - as suggested by the local
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movement center model (Morris 1987). The school desegrega-
tion campaign was assisted indirectly, without overt participa-
tion by the white community. This assistance was through a
separate but complementary challenge that targeted McFarland
and his policies other than segregation.
Whites in Topeka began to challenge the way in which the school
board and Superintendent McFarland's leadership of Topeka's
schools by the late 1940s.17 McFarland gave opponents plenty
of ammunition, and the campaign against his regime articulated
s~veral grievances besides segregation. One of the primary criti-
cisms of McFarland was his management style, which was auto-
cratic. Frank Wilson, Principal of Sumner Elementary School,
stated that "you were either a supporter of McFarland and con-
sidered yourself a 'company man' or you were out."18
McFarland's autocratic style of management and the manner in
which he led the school board culminated in a challenge by white
elites to both school board members and McFarland. While the
Brown brief was being prepared for court in April of 1951, half
of the school board responsible for hiring McFarland in 1942
was up for re-election (Wilson 1994:25).19 On April 3, 1951 they
were voted out of office.20 A few days after the election, on
AprilS, 1951, Superintendent Kenneth McFarland, turned in his
resignation effective August, 1951.21
The election of new school board members and the resignation
of.School Superintendent Kenneth McFarland changed the com-
mitment of the board of education to segregation. In September
1953, two and a half months before the State of Kansas was to re-
appear before the United States Supreme Court in defense of its
permissive segregation statute, the Board of Education of T0-
peka, Kansas, voted to abolish segregation in its elementary
schools.V
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Conclusion
The indirect action tactics that resulted in school desegregation
in Topeka were located within various types of organizations,
including the civil rights oriented NAACP as well as commu-
nity based types such as the AVC and even the PTA. This con-
trasts with Morris' (1984) local movement center model's em-
phasis on action located in the black churches and the religious
domain. While African-American churches, long-standing main-
stays of their communities, mobilized crucial resources in the
Southern mass-mobilization campaigns. Necessary funds, other
resources, andparticipants who could be mobilized were deployed
by the formal and informal organizations, formal leadership, and
communication networks concentrated in African American
churches (Morris 1984:279).
The indirect action in Topeka was characterized by the com-
bined efforts of formal and informal leaders as well as civil rights
organizations such as the local chapter of the NAACP. There
was not a concentrated location of collective action within the
religious domain, even though the lead plaintiff, Oliver Brown,
was studying for the clergy and worked part-time in St. John's
A.M.E. church.23 Action was mounted by political and social
justice organizations, civil rights attorneys, religious organiza-
tions, a veterans organization, and career activists working out-
side of established organizations. The eventual desegregation of
Topeka's schools developed out of actions and tactics that began
challenging segregation in public accommodations. These chal-
lenges were initiated by individuals addressing singular grievances
and were joined by others who were affiliated with the NAACP
and the community based AVC. Challenges to segregated schools
was carried out once again by the NAACP, but included the ad
hoc Citizens Committee, as well as individual efforts of Charles
and John Scott, and their law partner, Charles Bledsoe. School
desegregation was furthered by challenges by white elites to the
McFarland administration and school board through its PTA,
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and responses by the black PTA and teachers. Diverse actions,
separately controlled, loosely combined into what became the
1954 Brown case.
Notes
1. General Statute 21-2424, 1935.
2. General Statute 21-2424, 1935. Kansas City Call, September 26,1947,
and, November 24, 1947.
3. Kansas City Call, October 17, 1947.
4. Kansas City Call, October 17, 1947.
5. Kansas CityCall, October 10, 1947.
6. Among those individuals who belonged to both organizations were
two recently returned veterans named Charles and John Scott. The Scott broth-
ers were both sons of local civil rights attorney Elisha Scott and would later
argue the Browncasein Kansas Federal District Court Charles S. Scott Papers,
Kansas Collection.
7. Stovallu. City afTopeka, 166 Kan. 35 (1~48).
8. "...meetings of the Topeka NAACP were generally not attended by
more than a dozen members" (Speer 1968:22). "The NAACP meetings that
Burnett chaired rarely drew more than a dozen or so people and usually degen-
erated into gripe sessions"(Kluger 1975:393). The Citizens Committee did not
present itself as an NAACP delegation, since "mention of the NAA~P, it was
presumed, would have earned the back of the school board's hand" (Kluger
1975:393).
9. Mcfarland denied his or the school board's involvement in expand-
ing an informal system of segregation in Topeka High School See Brown v.
Board of Education, 98 F Supp. 797 (1951); Transcript of Record in Lower
Court, pp. 235-236. Burnett later described the race situation in the high school
as : "Up there at the high school while they called it integrated, it was inte-
grated only from the outside. When you got inside, it was just asJim Crow as
Alabama." SeeMcKinley Burnett interview with Dr. Hugh Speer, April 1967,
reported in Speer (1968) p. 22.
10. Brown o. Board ofEducation, 98 F Supp. 797 (1951); Transcript of
Record in lower court, p. 234.
11. Correspondence from Charles Bledsoe to Robert Carter, Topeka
NAACP Branch Files. Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas.
12. All departments and divisions of the school system were unified un-
der the superintendent, who alone was responsible to the Board for the execu-
tion of its policies (Kluger 1975:380).
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13. Caldwell had worked under McFarland in Coffeyville,Kansas(Kluger
1975:381). For a personal account of Caldwell, see Merrill Ross' oral history
transcript, Brown v. Board Oral History Collection. Ross was a coach and
teacher under Caldwell during the 1940s.
14. Caldwell was described by the Citizen's Committee as "stumbling
block to our progress and had...reduced the morale of the colored teachers 'to
an all time low" (Kluger 1975:393).
15. During the Graham case, Mamie Williams taught sixth and seventh
grade at the Buchanan School. See Brief for the Defendants, Graham u: Board
ofEducation ofTopeka (19). During the time of the Brown case,Miss Williams
was Principal at Washington School.
16. McKinley Burnett interview with Dr. Hugh Speer,April 1967.(Speer
1968:27).
17. Author interview with former Randolph School principal, Stan
Stalter, July 17, 1994. Topeka, Kansas. Mr. Stalter recalled that faculty at
Washburn University who had children in Topeka's public schools were par-
ticularly opposed to Superintendent McFarland's policies. Stalter felt that the
"movement" to remove Mcfarland began in the schools around Washburn
University.
18. Author interview, October 1994. Frank Wilson was Principal of
Sumner Elementary when Oliver Brown tried enroll his daughter Linda, in
1950.
19. Author interview with Stan Stalter, July 17,1994. Topeka, Kansas.
20. Two years later, on Apri17, 1953, the remaining half of the members
of the Board of Education were voted out of office. All who had been on the
Board when the Brown lawsuit was filed were off the board by August 1953.
The Brown case went to the United States Supreme Court on December 7,
1952. Memorandum on Brown compiled by the University of Kansas Law
Library, Reference Desk, August 1995. Copy in the private collection of the
author.
21. Topeka Capital, April 4, 1951;AprilS, 1951.
22. There was only one negative vote, by Mr. Oberhelman, who stated
that "he was no (sic) opposed to the policy, but felt that an orderly program
should be worked out before the resolution was passed." Segregation Policy.
Topeka Board of Education. Charles S. Scott papers. Kansas Collection. Uni-
versity of Kansas.
23. In the nineteenth century, the Social Gospel Movement was oriented
toward the socialdomain of religion. The religiousactivismof Reverend Charles
Sheldon resulted in social reforms for African Americans.
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